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INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, SECTION 269:
DOES THE LEFT HAND KNOW WHAT
THE RIGHT IS DOING?
Ralph S. Rice t
One of the less palatable ingredients in that potpourri of wisdom
and witlessness known as the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 is found
at Section 269. This section is essentially a reenactment of Section
129 of the old Code with some additions to be discussed hereafter.
Both sections provide that if any person or persons acquire control of
a corporation and the principal purpose of the acquisition was evasion
or avoidance of federal income tax by securing the benefit of an allow-
ance not otherwise available, the allowance may be forfeited. It may
also be forfeited if a corporation acquires property under circumstances
where it takes the transferor's basis, and the principal purpose of the
acquisition is the avoidance of such taxes.'
t Professor of Law, University of California, School of Law, Los Angeles.
1. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §269 provides:
"(a) In Geneiral-If-
(1) any person or persons acquire, or acquired on or after October 8, 1940,
directly or indirectly, control of a corporation, or
(2) any corporation acquires, or acquired on or after October 8, 1940, di-
rectly or indirectly, property of another corporation, not controlled, directly or
indirectly, immediately before such acquisition, by such acquiring corporation or
its stockholders, the basis of which property, in the hands of the acquiring cor-
poration, is determined by reference to the basis in the hands of the transferor
corporation,
and the principal purpose for which such acquisition was made is evasion or avoid-
ance of Federal income tax by securing the benefit of a deduction, credit, or other
allowance which such person or corporation would not otherwise enjoy, then such
deduction, credit, or other allowance shall not be allowed. For purposes of para-
graphs (1) and (2), control means the ownership of stock possessing at least 50
percent of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote or
(579)
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The objective of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 was to create
"the first comprehensive revision of the internal revenue laws
since before the turn of the century and the enactment of the in-
come tax." 2
We might accordingly anticipate that definitive content would be given
to statutes such as this, which purport to crystallize a distinction be-
tween allowable and forbidden arrangements of business transactions
with a view to minimizing taxes. Section 129 had provided no such
guide; Section 269 contributes affirmative confusion. The following
study in legislative fumbling is undertaken to clarify, so far as possible,
the theoretical scope and practical application of the latter section.
THE BACKGROUND OF SECTION 129
The generality of Section 129 was such that it was impossible to
forecast with any degree of assurance what transactions would be
caught within the scope of the section.3 One clue to its coverage may
be found in the considerable emphasis placed in the legislative history
of the statute upon the need to terminate the traffic in corporations
which had net operating losses, the benefits of which were sought by
at least 50 percent of the total value of shares of all classes of stock of the corpora-
tion.
"(b) Power of Secretary or His Delegate to Allow Deduction, etc., in Part.-
In any case to which subsection (a) applies the Secretary or his delegate is
authorized-
(1) to allow as a deduction, credit, or allowance any part of any amount
disallowed by such subsection, if he determines that such allowance will not
result in the evasion or avoidance of Federal income tax for which the acquisition
was made; or
(2) to distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, and distribute, ap-
portion, or allocate the deductions, credits, or allowances the benefit of which
was sought to be secured, between or among the corporations, or properties, or
parts thereof, involved, and to allow such deductions, credits, or allowances so
distributed, apportioned, or allocated, but to give effect to such allowance only
to such extent as he determines will not result in the evasion or avoidance of
Federal income tax for which the acquisition was made; or
(3) to exercise his powers in part under paragraph (1) and in part under
paragraph (2).
"(c) . .. ."
INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 129, added by 58 STAT. 47 (1944), was substantially
identical but for the addition of subsection (c) to § 269. See note 17 infra.
2. SEN. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1954) ; H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1954). These are referred to hereafter respectively as SENATE
REPORT and HOUSE REPORT.
3. The vagaries of § 129 have been exhaustively explored in a number of
unusually penetrating law review and other articles. Rudick, Acquisitions To Avoid
Ivcome or Excess Profits Tax: Section 129 of the Internal Revenue Code, 58 HARv.
L. REV. 196 (1944); Chase, An Analysis of Section 129 of the Internal Revenue
Code, 30 CORNELL L.Q. 421 (1945); Barnard, Acquisitions for Tax Benefit, 34
CALIF. L. REv. 36 (1946) ; Shelton, What To Do About Section 129, in HAND BOOK
OF TAX TECHNIQUES 558 (Lasser ed. 1951); Cohen, Exemptions and Credits of
Multiple Corporations: Sections 15 (c) and 129, 1953 So. CALir. TAX INsT. 1.
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persons acquiring their control.4  Otherwise, the legislative history of
Section 129 is not very helpful in interpreting Section 269. It is clear,
however, that Congress was well aware of the uncertainties involved
in the legislation: it was observed in the Senate report that the effective-
ness of the statute would depend on its administration,5 and that the
statute was not intended to control all types of potential tax avoidance.6
It was thus made clear at the beginning that the general principles
of the business purpose and step transaction doctrines remained a part
of the Commissioner's arsenal and would have to be taken into account
by a taxpayer seeking the benefits of tax deductions. There is nothing
in the legislative history of Section 269 of the Revenue Code of 1954
to the contrary.
The ineffectiveness of Section 129 was manifest from the time its
application was made to depend upon a finding that "the principal pur-
pose" of a transaction was the avoidance of taxes. Nevertheless, by
the regulations the Commissioner pursued the potentialities of the
statute by seeking, as best he might, to give some content to the term
"principal purpose." 7 He also described, in the regulations, certain
transactions which were said to be within the scope of the section.
Wrhile the list is not exclusive, it is informative as to the nature of the
cases to which the new section is potentially applicable.
4. H.R. REP. No. 871, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 23, 49 (1943), 1944 Cum. BU.L.
901, 919-20, 938-39.
5. "The success of such a provision will depend upon a sane and intelligent ad-
ministration. It should not be used to upset or overturn bona fide transactions or to
harass and annoy taxpayers who have acquired such property in bona fide acquisitions
with no intent to avoid or evade Federal income or profits taxes.' SEN. REP. No.
627, supra note 4, at 27, 1944 Cum. BULL. at 994.
6. It was observed that "the law applicable to the older types of avoidance has
acquired a definiteness which the law applicable to the newer types involving the
acquisition of the control of a corporation has not.' Id. at 59, 1944 Cum. BuLL.
at 1016-17. After commenting that the older types of tax avoidance were to be
controlled by previously existing case law including such cases as Higgins v. Smith,
308 U.S. 473 (1940) and Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935), the Senate
committee observed that "by thus recognizing these different types (which types
must necessarily be broad and which necessarily must overlap), your committee
believes that the effectiveness of section 129 will be increased, not only in the pre-
vention of avoidance schemes which defeat the basic policies of the several provisions
of the income and excess profits tax law, but also in assisting and faciltating bona
fide business transactions in accord with and effectuating such basic policies.' Id.
at 59, 1944 Cum. BULL. at 1017. The committee neglected to point out just how § 129
was to achieve this happy result
7. "If the purpose to evade or avoid Federal income or excess profits tax exceeds
in importance any other purpose, it is the principal purpose. This does not mean
that only those acquisitions fall within the provisions of section 129 which would not
have been made if the evasion or avoidance purpose was not present. The determina-
tion of the purpose for which an acquisition was made requires the scrutiny of the
entire circumstances in which the transaction or course of conduct occurred in connec-
tion with the tax result claimed to arise therefrom." U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.129-
3 (a) (2) (1953).
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Carryovers
As might have been expected, the first illustration of the scope of
the section concerned tax benefits arising from operating losses. Spe-
cifically, the regulation provided that the section applied in cases where
a corporation with large profits acquired control of another corpora-
tion with present or potential credit deductions, net operating losses,
unused excess profits credits or other allowances, if the acquisition were
followed by bringing those credits into conjunction with the income.'
However, judicial response to the regulation was something less than
enthusiastic. In a series of four cases, the Commissioner tried to cause
the forfeiture of operating loss credit or deduction under these circum-
stances. All were decided contrary to his position. In one case it was
indicated by way of dicta that Section 129
"would seem to prohibit the use of a deduction, credit or allow-
ance only by the acquiring person or corporation and not their
use by the corporation whose control was acquired." '
If this can be considered to represent the reasoned view of the Tax
Court, it would seem that Section 129 could never be properly invoked
to forfeit allowances arising from this kind of transaction.
In another case the Tax Court rejected a claim of the Commis-
sioner that no net operating loss was available to a corporation which
had been taken over by members of a partnership who channeled
profitable business through the corporation and used a prior net operat-
ing loss of the corporation to prevent the accrual of federal income tax
to it. In a very brusque and brief statement which did not refer to
Section 129 and demonstrated no understanding of the defendant's
plan to obtain a tax deduction, the court simply observed that "the
Commissioner has adopted a scheme to increase taxes without authority
and has erred." 10
In the two remaining cases, the court considered specific claims that
Section 129 operated to restrict the device here in question; in both
cases the evidence respecting a purpose to minimize payment of taxes
seemed exceptionally strong and the commercial purposes for the trans-
actions in question appeared dubious. The decisions placed consider-
able emphasis on the fact that the section was inoperative unless "the
8. It must be said that the latter qualification on this transaction is really not
a qualification at all. If a deduction becomes available to a taxpayer it is scarcely
evidence of tax avoidance that he uses it.
9. Alprosa Watch Corp., 11 T.C. 240, 245 (1948). Here the statute was not in
effect at the time of the transaction under consideration and the claim was made
that § 129 was declaratory of pre-existing law.
10. A.B. & Container Corp., 14 T.C. 842, 846 (1950).
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principal purpose" was to avoid taxes, although the court properly at-
tempted no generalizations as to how a principal purpose should be
ascertained."'
Corporate Divisions
The Commissioner has also felt that Section 129 may properly be
invoked with respect to corporate divisions. An obvious taxpayer re-
sponse to excess profits taxes on a corporation, imposed at high rates
when Section 129 was adopted, is to divide the corporation and con-
sequently minimize the rates on its income and excess profits. Ac-
cordingly, a regulation was adopted to forfeit an allowance where
"a corporation with large profits transfers the assets of each of
its branches or departments to newly organized corporations in
order to secure the benefits of the minimum excess profits
credit. .. . ," 12
Here again the Commissioner has found it impossible to surmount the
barrier which required proof that the creation of divisions arose, as
a "principal purpose," from a desire to avoid taxes.18
A variation of the foregoing practices likewise was condemned by
the Commissioner under circumstances that seem so unusual as to
present no practical problem in tax avoidance. A regulation was
adopted which provided that, if a profit corporation split off its high
earning assets to a new subsidiary and thereafter continued the old
business at a loss which might be carried back to get a tax refund for
prior years, this would be construed to be a violation of Section 129.11
The concept of a taxpayer intentionally continuing the business at a
loss in order to get a carryback for tax purposes is, at the least, in-
triguing.
The Purchase of Depreciation
The foregoing observations deal with those provisions of Section
129 which provided for the forfeiture of deductions where any person
or persons acquire control of a corporation. Subsection (a) (2) of the
statute deals with the entirely different situation in which A Corporation
11. Wage, Inc., 19 T.C. 249 (1952); Commodores Point Terminal Corp., 11
T.C. 411 (1948).
12. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.129-3(b) (2) (1953).
13. Alcorn Wholesale Co., 16 T.C. 75 (1951); Chelsea Products, Inc., 16 T.C.
840 (1951), aff'd, 197 F.2d 620 (3d Cir. 1952); Berland's Inc., 16 T.C. 182 (1951);
J. E. Dilworth Co. v. Henslee, 98 F. Supp. 957 (M.D. Tenn. 1951). These cases
are eloquently discussed, along with the implications arising from § 15(c) of the
old Code (since expired) in Cohen, supra note 3.
14. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.129-3 (b) (3) (1953).
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acquires property of B Corporation and takes the basis of the latter cor-
poration's property with the principal purpose of avoiding federal in-
come taxes. Under the regulations this portion of the statute is in-
tended to apply where a
"corporation acquires property having in its hands a substituted
basis which is materially greater than its fair market value at
the time of such acquisition in order to secure a larger excess
profits credit or to utilize the property to create tax-reducing
losses." "
To illustrate the statute further, let us assume that Corporation A ex-
changes its stock for substantially all the assets of Corporation B in a
tax-free merger. The assets of Corporation B have a basis of $100,000
but are worth only $20,000. B's financial situation is such that the
depreciation deduction, or a loss on the sale of its assets is valueless to
it. After the transaction, Corporation A will be able to depreciate the
assets to the extent of $100,000, or if sold for $20,000 take a loss of
$80,000. In return for this privilege, Corporation A has paid, in the
value of its stock, $20,000 representing the value of the assets and,
presumably, a further negotiated amount representing the value of the
depreciation or capital loss deduction. Where such a transaction was
entered into for the principal purpose of avoiding taxes, the Commis-
sioner would be authorized to disallow the deduction.
DOCTRINE CONTROLLING THE APPLICATION OF SECTION 269
Cases Involving the Purchase of Depreciation
It has been noted in the preceding paragraphs that the provisions
of Section 129 (a) (2) were quite obviously designed to prevent, among
other transactions considered improper, arrangements where a corpora-
tion with expectations of substantial income might reduce that income
by the acquisition of assets with a high basis and low value. The
absence of cases in this area under the old statute was not difficult to
understand. The multiple factors in transfers of assets in tax-free
reorganizations were so complex and the reluctance of courts to im-
pute bad faith to a taxpayer in this area so generally pronounced in
recent years that the prospects of the Commissioner for success in any
transaction likely to be undertaken was remote. Clear cases might be
imagined where the section would apply, but few taxpayers would un-
dertake a transaction in such an event.
This difficulty in proof unquestionably motivated the adoption of
supplementary provisions when Section 129 was reenacted as Section
269 of the new Code. The ineffectiveness of the section was a subject
15. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, §39.129-3 (c) (1953).
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, SECTION 269
of some concern by committees of Congress. In both House and
Senate committee reports it was observed that
"The effectiveness of this provision [Section 129] has been
impaired by the difficulty of establishing whether or not tax avoid-
ance was the principal purpose of the acquisition." 16
The language of the amendment indicates that it is aimed only at
bargain purchases of depreciation. Essentially, it creates a presump-
tion that the section has been violated where persons acquire the con-
trol of a corporation for a sum which is substantially disproportionate
to (1) the adjusted basis of the property, and (2) the tax benefits not
otherwise available to the acquirer. 1
The purpose and function of the new subsection may be illustrated
by restatement of the example given earlier. Let us assume that A
Corporation merges with B Corporation, and that B Corporation has
assets worth $20,000 with a basis of $100,000. If A Corporation
gives B Corporation stock of the value of $40,000, a presumption arises
under Section 269(c) that A Corporation intended to buy a deprecia-
tion deduction. This is because the consideration was disproportionate
to the $100,000 basis of the property. Thus A is presumably buying
an excessive depreciation deduction of $80,000 and paying $20,000 for
it, this $20,000 representing the difference between the value of the
property and the value of the stock given for it. The committee reports
make it clear that the foregoing interpretation is the one which was
intended by Congress. Both the House and Senate reports specifically
provide with respect to the amendment that
"This provision will apply to cases where the tax basis of the
property acquired for depreciation and other purposes, together
with the tax value of other tax benefits, such as operating loss
carryovers, is substantially greater than the amount paid for the
property. Disparities of this type generally arise where the old
basis is continued in the hands of the new owner." IS
16. HousE REPORT 32; SENAT REPORT 39.
17. INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, §269(c) provides:
"(c) PRESUMMON IN CASE OF DIsPROPoRTIONATE PURCHASE PsicE.-The fact
that the consideration paid upon an acquisition by any person or corporation de-
scribed in subsection (a) is substantially disproportionate to the aggregate-
(1) of the adjusted basis of the property of the corporation (to the extent
attributable to the interest acquired specified in paragraph (1) of subsection
(a)), or of the property acquired specified in paragraph (2) of subsection (a);
and
(2) of the tax benefits (to the extent not reflected in the adjusted basis
of the property) not available to such person or corporation otherwise than as
a result of such acquisition,
shall be prima facie evidence of the principal purpose of evasion or avoidance of
Federal income tax. This subsection shall apply only with respect to acquisitions
after March 1, 1954."
18. HousE REPoRT 32, A 67; SENATE REPORT 39, 229.
19551
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It may be noted in passing that under the House bill the presump-
tion here created was required to be rebutted by a "clear preponder-
ance" of the evidence; under the Senate bill, which was finally adopted,
the transaction merely constituted "prima facie" evidence of a principal
purpose to avoid the tax. Particularly should it be noted that on the
basis of the reports the presumption arises only where the tax basis
of the property acquired, plus other tax benefits, is "substantially
greater" than the consideration. The statute itself requires only that
the price paid be substantially "disproportionate" to the adjusted basis
of the property received plus the other tax benefits.
Cases Involving Corporate Divisions
It has been noted that Section 129 was broad enough to include
within the scope of its operation cases in which corporate divisions
were made with the purpose of evading or avoiding federal income
tax. It has also been noted that the statute was totally ineffective for
this purpose because of the difficulty of proving tax evasion or avoid-
ance as the "principal purpose." 11
The problem persists despite subsection (c) of Section 269. Cor-
porate divisions simply are not involved in this subsection since
the corporate entity which was carved from the original corporation
would presumably surrender all of its stock for all of the assets which
it received, in which case the value of the stock would be the same as
the value of the assets and the consideration paid would thus be com-
pletely proportionate to the assets received.
The extent to which Section 269 can be invoked to disallow a de-
duction or a credit arising from corporate divisions is accordingly very
doubtful. So far as Section 269 is concerned, such divisions are in
precisely the same situation as they were prior to the adoption of the
Revenue Act of 1954. That is, notwithstanding the wealth of com-
ments in the committee reports respecting the ineffectiveness of
Section 129, no move was made to strengthen it with respect to cor-
porate divisions. This is particularly significant in view of the fact
that the Tax Court had uniformly refused to invoke the section in this
area prior to the adoption of the new Code.
It is logical to assume that in the face of these decisions Congress
simply gave up trying to draft a means of applying a general statute
to the corporate division problem and sought instead to find a solu-
19. See text at note 13 and note 13 supra. Indeed the section had to be sup-
plemented by § 15 (c) of the old Code which sought to control corporate divisions
undertaken to avoid the effect of the excess profits tax in effect during the Korean
War. See Cohen, supra note 3.
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tion in specific provisions respecting corporate divisions which were
incorporated elsewhere in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. This
is borne out by the fact that extensive Code provisions to handle prob-
lems of corporate divisions were adopted in the new Code. Section 368
defines the term "reorganization" to include
"a transfer by a corporation of all or a part of its assets to another
corporation if immediately after the transfer the transferor, or one
or- more of its shareholders . . . is in control of the corporation
to which the assets are transferred. ,, 20
By the terms of this section, however, the parent must distribute the
stock of the subsidiary to the shareholders of the parent; if this is
done,2 ' there is no recognition of gain or loss to the corporations and
no income would be taxed to the stockholder provided that the require-
ments of Sections 354, 355 and 366 were met.
Ultimately, the transaction is controlled by Section 355 which
deals with the same problem which was formerly sought to be resolved
under Section 129. Space does not permit an exhaustive discussion of
Section 355. However, if tax consequences are not to be recognized,
two basic conditions must exist. First, under Section 355 (b), both of
the corporations must be engaged in the active conduct of business im-
mediately after the transaction, and each of such businesses must have
been in existence for a period of five years prior to the transaction.
Second, under Section 355 (a) (1) (B), gain or loss shall be recognized
upon distribution of the stock to the shareholders of the distributing
corporation if the transaction was
"used principally as a device for the distribution of the earnings
and profits of the distributing corporation or the controlled cor-
poration or both (but the mere fact that subsequent to the distribu-
tion stock or securities in one or more of such corporations are
sold or exchanged by all or some of the distributees (other than
pursuant to an arrangement negotiated or agreed upon prior to
such distribution) shall not be construed to mean that the transac-
tion was used principally as such a device)." 22
20. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 368 (a) (1) (D) provides: "a transfer by a cor-
poration of all or a part of its assets to another corporation if immediately
after the transfer the transferor, or one or more of its shareholders (including
persons who were shareholders immediately before the transfer), or any combina-
tion thereof, is in control of the corporation to which the assets are transferred;
but only if, in pursuance of the plan, stock or securities of the corporation to which
the assets are transferred are distributed in a transaction which qualifies under
section 354, 355, or 356."
21. If this is not done there is no reorganization. However, neither are there
tax consequences at this point since, as between the two corporations, § 351 operates
to prevent recognition of gain or loss on the transaction.
22. Section 356 imposes additional limitations on transfer of securities under
these circumstances, as distinguished from transfer of stocks.
1955]
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It should be noted that the foregoing subsection would cause a
transaction to be taxable in the event that it was "used principally as a
device for the distribution of the earnings and profits" and that Sec-
tion 269 is broad enough to include corporate divisions within its scope
where they are undertaken with the "principal purpose" of avoiding
federal income tax. It is consequently apparent that there is an over-
lapping between these two sections. It seems doubtful that there is
any difference between a device "used principally" to avoid a tax and
one in which "the principal purpose" is to avoid a tax. There is no
legislative history which will inform us respecting the scope of the
term "used principally." The net effect of Section 269 on the corporate
division section accordingly seems to be to weaken rather than
strengthen it:
(a) A corporate division which will enable taxpayers to recoup
their investment in a business without recognition of tax consequences
by disposing of stock in a controlled corporation carved out of a distribu-
tor corporation is specifically authorized by Section 368 (a) (1) (D)
and Sections 354 and 355.
(b) One limitation on the use of this device is that distribution of
stock by the distributor corporation to its stockholders is not tax free
if the transaction was "used principally as a device for the distribution
of the earnings and profits."
(c) Assuming that "principal purpose" as used in Section 269
(the same language of Section 129 of the old Code) is the same in
meaning as the words "used principally" in Section 355, the cases
dealing with corporate division problems under Section 129 of the old
Code are relevant in interpreting the provision in Section 355. In view
of the extensive attention paid to Section 129 of the old Code, it may
hardly be argued that the use of the same basic language in Sections
269 and 355 was inadvertent.
(d) As has been indicated,2 3 the term "principal purpose" in Sec-
tion 129 of the old Code was given a most restrictive interpretation by
the Tax Court.
(e) When the Revenue Code of 1954 was being considered, Con-
gress was cognizant of the weaknesses of Section 129, but nevertheless
did not see fit to strengthen control of tax avoidance by corporate divi-
sions under Section 269, although they did create a prima facie pre-
sumption with respect to cases involving purchase of depreciation or
loss assets.
23. See cases cited in text at notes 9-13 supra.
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(f) Accordingly, it appears not only that Section 269 has no
effective force with respect to corporate divisions generally, but that
congressional use of similar language may operate to encourage tax
avoidance under Section 355.
Application of Section 269 to Carryover Problems
The avowed purpose of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as ex-
pressed in reports of both the House and Senate committees, was to
"remove inequities, to end harassment of the taxpayer and to
reduce tax barriers to future expansion of production and em-
ployment." 24
Among other sections presumably intended to relieve the harassment
and perfect the taxpayer in legislative grace is Section 381, which au-
thorizes the carryover of many tax benefits from a corporation which is
absorbed in a tax-free transaction to the corporation which absorbs it.
In the words of the committee reports, it is the purpose of this section to
"enable the successor corporation to step into the 'tax shoes' of
its predecessor corporation without necessarily conforming to arti-
ficial legal requirements which now exist under court-made law." 25
The importance of the section is attested by the number and the nature
of the benefits which may carry over. Illustrative of these items are net
operating losses, deficits in earnings and profitS, capital losses, account-
ing methods (including those used in computing depreciation, install-
ment sales, and amortization of discount or premium), credits for pre-
paid income, deductions with respect to pension plans, and deduction
of expenses deferred by the transferor.
Carryover benefits are, however, limited by Section 382. That
section purports to restrain potential tax avoidance through traffic in
loss corporations in two circumstances. Where purchase of an interest
in a loss corporation is undertaken, the loss carryover is forfeited
"if more than 50 percent of the stock of a corporation is purchased
within a 2-year period and if the corporation thereafter engages in
a different type of business." 26
The net operating loss of a transferor corporation is available to the
new corporation without diminution only if the stockholders of the old
loss corporation have twenty per cent of the stock in the new corporation
24. HousE REPORT 1; SENATE REPORT 1.
25. HousE REPoRT 41; SENATE RE1oRT 52.
26. This is the explanation of §382(a) given in SENATE REPo T 53.
1955l
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after the transaction. If they receive a smaller percentage, the amount
of the carryover is reduced proportionately. 7
The benefits of Section 381 are such that many taxpayers may be
expected to arrange their commercial affairs so as to take advantage of
it. For example, its benefits are limited to corporations. We may as-
sume that an individual is operating a profitable enterprise, whereas, a
corporation has accumulated a very substantial net operating loss. If
the individual were to begin doing business as a corporation and were
to merge with the loss corporation under the requirements of Section
381 (a), he would be able to take advantage of the net operating loss.
However, if he bought the assets of the loss corporation, there would
be no carryover to him as an individual; if he bought the stock of the
loss corporation, he would run afoul of Section 382 (a) to the extent
that the net operating loss of the loss corporation would be forfeited if
there were a change in the business in which it engaged. Accordingly,
he may incorporate. If (pursuant to Section 382(b)) the stockholders
of the loss corporation own twenty percent of the stock of the combined
corporations after this reorganization, the loss will carry over, under
the explicit terms of the statute.
Under such circumstances it must be evident that the purpose of
the taxpayer in entering the corporate form of business is to qualify un-
der Section 381. In this sense it may be said that a principal purpose
is to minimize his taxes. Moreover, he pursues that purpose by arrang-
ing his transaction to avoid the pitfalls of Section 382.
May he pursue such a course of conduct safely?
The problems posed by this question are generally familiar to the
tax bar. He must consider the potential applicability of the so-called
business purpose rule; he must avoid pitfalls inherent in the step trans-
action doctrine; and finally-to come to the danger which is the sub-
ject of these comments-he must avoid the strictures of Section 269.
The operation of that section will first be considered in general terms.
Thereafter, its application to representative transactions will be ex-
amined.
(a) Arguments supporting the view that Section 269 may be in-
voked to disallow credits and deductions otherwise authorized in carry-
over cases by Section 381 and not prohibited by Section 382.-The
principal argument supporting application of Section 269 to carryover
cases is simply that the statute, however obscure and poorly drafted, is
expressed in very broad terms. That is, where a party engages in a
transaction in which carryover is authorized by Section 381 and not
27. Ibid.
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impaired by Section 382 he may still be acquiring control of a corpora-
tion with the principal purpose of obtaining an allowance not otherwise
available. The literal words of the statute are thus extensive enough so
that the Commissioner might disallow a carryover in every case if he
could show that the "principal purpose" of a transaction was to obtain
the benefit. It is obvious that a basic objective of Sections 381 and 382
was to take the carryover situation off the "principal purpose" merry-
go-round. Yet the ghost of Section 129 still rides it.
That the ghost may be something more than ectoplasm is shown
by a paragraph concerning Section 382 in the Senate committee report.
It was there observed that
"If a limitation in this section applies to a net operating loss carry-
over, section 269, relating to acquisitions made to evade or avoid
income tax, shall not also be applied to such net operating loss
carryover. However, the fact that a limitation under this section
does not apply shall have no effect upon whether section 269
applies." 28
For reasons stated hereafter, it is difficult to believe that the committee
meant what was written. If it did mean it, then Section 269 conceivably
could apply in any cases except those in which a forfeiture of a loss
carryover is required under the terms of Section 382. We must assume
that every taxpayer conducting a liquidation or merger under Section
381 will have in mind the tax consequences of his conduct. Is it pos-
sible that no matter how carefully the transaction is conducted to con-
form to that section there is a practical possibility that the tax benefit
will be lost because it is determined that the principal purpose of the
transaction was to obtain the benefit? The following comments cast
substantial doubt on such a result.
(b) Arguments supporting the view that Section 269 may not be
invoked to disallow credits and deductions in carryover cases.-(1)
Arguments arising from Section 381. There is nothing in the legisla-
tive history of Section 381 with respect to its relationship to Section
269. However, both committee reports recite that Section 381 was
adopted because practice under the old Code rested "on court-made law
which is uncertain and frequently contradictory" and that
"whether or not the carryover is allowed should be based upon
economic realities rather than upon such artificialities as the legal
form of the reorganization." 2"
If stability and predictability constitute the sine qua non of legislative
purpose here, it can hardly be argued that Congress intended a statute
28. SENATE REPORT 284.
29. HOUSE REPORT 41; SENATE REPORT 52.
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as uncertain as Section 269 to apply to these transactions. Moreover,
there is nothing in the legislative history of Section 381 which
would indicate any qualification whatsoever upon its general operation.
In cases where an exception exists, it has been expressly stated. For
example, it was observed that the section was not intended to affect
the carryover treatment of items or tax attributes in corporate trans-
actions not described." Since some exceptions are specifically noted,
it may be argued that the general provisions of Section 269 should not
be invoked to create exceptions not specifically expressed.
Finally, it may be significant that, with the exceptions noted, Sec-
tion 381 itself contains no reservations whatsoever. Accordingly, it
may be argued that the statute itself demonstrates that Congress in-
tended the section to be freely and fully available at the option of the
taxpayer and in all events. It is unquestionably true that every trans-
action conducted within the purview of Section 381 will be undertaken
only after a consideration of the tax benefits involved. Even assuming
that the purpose of obtaining a tax benefit is the principal purpose which
motivates, for example, the liquidation of a subsidiary by a parent, it is
dubious that the benefit would thereupon be lost. Should the benefit
be denied by virtue of the terms of Section 269 under those circum-
stances, it would seem to be squarely in conflict with the observation
respecting Section 381 in the committee reports that
"under this provision, a corporation which acquires substantially
all of the property of another corporation in a tax-free distribution
or transfer is to take into its accounts the specified items of the
distributor or transferor corporation." 31
(2) Argument arising from Section 382. We have already noted
the observation by the Senate committee that the mere fact that Section
382 does not apply is not evidence that Section 269 does not apply to a
stated situation. This is itself inconsistent with other observations in
the reports. For example, the failure of Section 129 was pointed out
to justify the adoption of Section 382:
"This provision [Section 129] has proved ineffectual, however,
because of the necessity of proving that tax avoidance was the
primary purpose of the transaction. It has also been so uncertain
in its effects as to place .a premium on litigation and a damper on
valid business transactions." 32
30. HousE REPORT A 135; SENATE REPORT 277. Presumably this would include
those cases in which the Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co. v. Commsso ir (187 F.2d
718 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 827 (1951)) rule is to be applied under
§334(b) (1), and cases involving corporate divisions.
31. HousE REPORT 41; SENATE REPORT 52.
32. HOUSE REPORT 41-42; SENATE REPORT 53.
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It would seem from these comments that Section 382 was in-
tended to supplant, rather than supplement, Section 129. Surely Con-
gress did not mean to reinvigorate a statute which had placed a "premium
on litigation and a damper on valid business transactions." The pur-
pose of this comment could only have been to justify the adoption of
Section 382 as a substitute for Section 129 in the carryover cases.
(3) Arguments arising from the nature of Section 269. Another
persuasive argument respecting the intention of Congress is found in
the nature of Section 269(c). We have illustrated the application of
the statute to a taxpayer buying depreciation. Let us now consider an
example respecting its application to loss carryovers.
Assume that Profit Corporation acquires control of Loss Corpora-
tion. Both are in the same business. The latter has property with an
adjusted basis of $100,000 which is worth $100,000. It also has a net
operating loss which has a value to Profit Corporation of $50,000.
Consequently, Profit Corporation purchases all the stock of Loss Cor-
poration for approximately $150,000. It does so with a view to using
the loss. This price is, however, substantially proportionate to
a. The adjusted basis of the property, and
b. The tax benefits not previously available to Profit Corporation.
Accordingly, there is no presumption that a "principal purpose" of
the transaction was tax avoidance.
This is, of course, reaffirmed by the observation in the committee
reports that the subsection is to apply to cases where the tax basis for
the depreciation of the property plus the value of the other tax benefits
is substantially greater than the amount paid for the property. 3
It is anomalous to conclude that the purchase of a net operating
loss deduction is irrelevant to establish a prima facie violation of Sec-
tion 269, but to say also that if purchase of the loss is the principal
purpose of taking over the loss corporation, this deduction so carefully
excluded from consideration under Section 269(c) shall be forfeited
under Section 269(a). If Congress is providing that the purchase of
a loss is irrelevant to prove a prima facie violation of the statute, it
may well be argued that the purchase of a loss was likewise intended to
be excluded from the purview of the very general language incorporated
earlier in the statute.
Another approach to the interpretation of Section 269 may be
found by examining general coverage of the statute in context with old
Section 129 and other statutes concerning the same subject matter.
33. HousE REPor 32; SENATE REPORT 39.
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The old section dealt with corporate divisions, purchase of depreciation
benefits, and purchase of other tax benefits. The problem of corporate
divisions is covered by Section 355 of the new Code. Provisions re-
spedting purchase of depreciation have been strengthened by Section
269 (c) and the section obviously is intended to be effective in that area.
Transfer of tax benefits is likewise intended to be controlled by statutes
dealing directly with the problem, Section 381 which authorizes such
transfer and Section 382 which places specific limitations on it. All
this suggests that Congress intended to reorient Section 129 by the
amendment in Section 269 and aim it only at transactions where an
acquiring corporation sought to buy a depreciation allowance or loss
by obtaining property with a high basis and a low value in such a man-
ner as to get the high basis at a disproportionate price.
In addition, it should be remembered that when subsection (c)
was adopted-the only change in old Section 129-Congress empha-
sized that the statute was deficient because it was so difficult to show
that tax avoidance was the principal purpose of an acquisition.34 Yet
no attempt was made to strengthen the section with respect to the carry-
over problem, notwithstanding that the Commissioner had lost every
case he had taken to the Tax Court on the operating loss issue.35
This leaves the Commissioner in an unenviable position. The
very most that he can claim is that a net operating loss of one cor-
poration, utilized by another corporation or its stockholders, may be
disallowed under Section 269 if it could have been disallowed under
Section 129. Consequently, he has the burden of proof in showing that
the "principal purpose" in a transaction in which a net operating loss
becomes available to a profit corporation or its shareholders was to
obtain a tax advantage not otherwise available. As a practical matter,
it is difficult to apply a statute which provides that a little purpose to
save taxes is all right, but too much of such a purpose is fatal. The
Tax Court very properly met this practical problem in a practical man-
ner by refusing to apply the statute in specific cases which came before
it, even where substantial tax-saving purpose was evident.
The presence of Section 269 (c) thus weakens the case of the Com-
missioner: it was inserted to make old Section 129 effective and ex-
pressly excluded tax benefits other than purchase of depreciation from
its scope. Under all standards of statutory interpretation, it must be
said that Congress approved earlier judicial doctrine interpreting Sec-
tion 129, except to the extent described by the amendment. The Com-
missioner found it impossible to win cases involving some commercial
34. HousE REPORT 32; SENATE REPoRT 39.
35. See text at notes 9-11 and notes 9-11 supra.
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purpose under the old law. There is every reason to believe that his
road will be even more rocky under Section 269.
Finally, it should be remembered that the scope of Section 129
of the old Code never has been clear. As we have noted earlier, there
is dicta in the Alprosa Watch " decision that the old Section 129 pro-
hibited deductions by those acquiring control of the corporation but
not of the corporation whose control is acquired. On the basis of the
same case, it may also be said that where the acquiring person or per-
sons were individual stockholders, as distinguished from corporations,
the transaction may not be covered by Section 129."1
In general, it must be doubted that Section 269 will have a sub-
stantial effect on purchase of tax benefits, other than depreciation,
through obtaining control of a loss corporation by merger, liquidation
or otherwise. Any forecast respecting how it will be used in specific
cases is obviously subjective. Moreover, conclusions may be changed
by regulations issued by the Commissioner. Subject to these qualifi-
cations, the following conclusions concerning a few representative cases
are ventured.
EXAMPLES OF THE EFFECT OF SECTION 269
Purchase of Stock Controlling Loss Corporation Followed by
Continued Operation in the Same Business
It is hard to conceive of any case where a purchase of stock con-
trolling a loss corporation by persons seeking a loss deduction, followed
by continued operation of the corporation in the same business, would
permit the Commissioner to invoke Section 269. The cases hitherto
decided under Section 129 resolved all doubts respecting the purpose
of such a transaction in favor of the taxpayer even where unrelated busi-
nesses were involved. Where control of a related business is purchased,
it would seem almost a practical impossibility for the Commissioner to
demonstrate that tax avoidance was a "principal purpose" of the ac-
quisition in view of these cases and the multiple business reasons which
might justify it. In addition, when Section 129 was amended as Sec-
tion 269 of the new Code, there was no attempt to strengthen the statute
in this respect. Moreover, this device clearly is not prohibited by
Section 382; by the terms of subsection (a) (1) (C), the section does
not apply where the same line of business is continued by the loss com-
pany. Indeed, the Senate report emphasizes that this subsection was
inserted to
36. See note 9 supra.
37. See Cohen, supra note 3, at 9, 10; Shelton, What to Do About Section 129,
in HANDBOOK OF TAX TEcHNIQUEs 558, 566, 567 (Lasser ed. 1951).
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"limit the application of this provision [Section 382] . . . to
those areas in which abuse has most often arisen, that is, the pur-
chase of the stock of a corporation with a history of losses for the
purpose of using its loss carryovers to offset gains of a business
unrelated to that which provided the losses."3
By a process of negative inference it may be argued-indeed it
seems clear-that congressional approval has been given to use of loss
carryovers to offset gains of a business which is in fact related to that
which produced the losses. Indeed, the conference report recites that
if the loss corporation
"continued to carry on substantially the same trade or business,
the limitation would not be applicable even though the corpora-
tion also added a new trade or business." "
Merger of Profit Corporation with Loss Corporation
It has been noted that Section 381 (a) authorizes a loss carryover
where a profit corporation exchanges its stock for substantially all the
assets of a loss corporation under certain circumstances. It has also
been noted that under Section 382 (b) the loss will be forfeited in whole
or in part if the stockholders of the loss corporation do not own twenty
per cent of the fair market value of the stock of the profit corporation
after the transaction. It is conceivable that persons controlling a
profit corporation might cause that corporation to merge with a loss
corporation for the "principal purpose" of obtaining a tax benefit. In
such a case the application of Section 269 would not be completely fore-
closed as a matter of theory since the statute does in fact still provide
that the Commissioner may disallow a credit or deduction arising from
the acquisition of control of a corporation by any person pursuant to an
intent to avoid federal income tax.
For reasons discussed earlier, the realistic prospects for practical
application of Section 269 to these circumstances are very slight. First
and most important, it is evident that in any such reorganization, in-
numerable commercial purposes may be served by the merger. Even
the most unimaginative taxpayer would be able to point to business pur-
poses sufficient to satisfy the requirements of proof set up under the
cases interpreting Section 129. In addition, the amendment of Sec-
tion 129, Section 269 (c), would seem to indicate that the current ap-
plication of the section was limited to only those cases in which a tax-
payer purchased tax benefits by way of depreciation or sale of assets.
38. SENATE REPoRT 53 (emphasis added).
39. H.R. REP. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1954).
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This view is supported by repeated reference in the committee reports
to the need to have restrictions on tax avoidance specifically stated.
Finally, the flat terms of Section 381 authorize such a carryover with-
out qualification of any sort. There is no warrant for reading the
generalities of Section 269 as a gloss upon the specific authorization for
carryover contained in Section 381.
One caveat should be entered here. Where a profit corporation
and a loss corporation merge where there is no prior common control,
the foregoing observations clearly would appear to be compelling. Let
us consider, however, a case in which the stockholders of the profit
corporation acquire all the stock of loss corporation by purchase from
the original stockholders, and then they merge the two corporations.
By so doing, they avoid the requirement of Section 382(b) that the
stockholders in the loss corporation must own twenty per cent of the
value of the stock in the acquiring corporation after merger. This is,
of course, similar to the purchase by the profit corporation of the stock
of the loss corporation, followed by liquidation, which is discussed in
the following paragraphs. For the reasons there examined at length,
it is doubtful that the requirements of Section 382 could thus be cir-
cumvented.
Liquidation of Loss Subsidiary by Parent Corporation
(a) Where the loss corporation has been a subsidiary for some
time.-Section 381 (a) authorizes a carryover of a loss from a liqui-
dated subsidiary to a parent corporation under circumstances stated.
Not infrequently a substantial purpose for liquidation-at least the prin-
cipal reason for liquidation at the time chosen-will be to obtain the
tax benefits of the subsidiary for the parent. Even more than in the
case of mergers, the decided cases and the numberless commercial rea-
sons for any liquidation will serve to insulate the transaction against ap-
plication of Section 269. Other factors discussed in the merger con-
text are equally applicable here: particularly it appears unlikely that a
general statute such as Section 269 could impair a transaction so ex-
plicitly authorized under Section 381.
(b) Where stock in the loss corporation was purchased shortly
before liquidation or merger.-Assume a case where a profit corpora-
tion purchases the stock of a loss corporation and liquidates it or, simi-
larly, where persons purchase the stock and cause the loss corporation
to be merged with a profit corporation which they likewise control. As
long as the loss corporation remains in the same business, Section
382(a) does not, in terms, apply. Carryover through the next step-
19551
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liquidation or merger as the case may be-is specifically authorized by
Section 381. We have noted that the purpose of the latter section was
to "enable the successor corporation to step into the 'tax shoes' of its
predecessor corporation" and that tax results of reorganizations and
liquidations were intended to
"depend less upon the form of the transaction than upon the eco-
nomic integration of two or more separate businesses into a unified
business enterprise." 40
These purposes are satisfied by such a transaction. Consequently,
there is ample room to argue that Section 269 may not be invoked to
impair a carryover in such circumstances. In addition, all the other
arguments hitherto made to show the general ineffectiveness of Section
269 may be asserted.
Arguments to the contrary, however, may not be ignored. In the
first place, we must recall that the Senate report indicates that discon-
tinuance of a substantial part of a business will have the same effect as
changing it, so the transaction might be caught under the specific
terms of Section 382. In addition, we must recall the observation in
the Senate report that Section 269 might apply even where Section 382
did not, and remember that Section 269 is in terms broad enough to
catch it. Most important, such a device would quite possibly run afoul
of the so-called step transaction doctrine which has a vitality far be-
yond that of Section 269 in this area. Whether a doctrine of such
uncertain bounds would in fact be applied is by no means clear, but the
dangers inherent in it render dubious any attempt to circumvent it.
Subdividing a Profit Corporation as a Preliminary to Merger
Consideration should likewise be given to another method of ar-
ranging a merger so that the stockholders of the loss corporation will
have a continuing interest in the profit corporation after merger, within
the twenty per cent requirements of Section 382(b). Assume a case
where the profit corporation is worth eight times as much as the loss
corporation. If the corporations merged and the stockholders of the
loss corporation received only one-ninth of the stock, the loss would
be forfeited proportionately. Consequently, the profit corporation splits
off one corporation so that the value of each of the corporations after
the split-up is four times that of the loss corporation. Presumably, this
would be followed, pursuant to Section 355, by a distribution of the
stock in the split-off corporation to the stockholders of the original
40. SENATE REPORT 52.
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corporation. Profitable contracts of the corporations are likewise di-
vided. Thereafter, one of the corporations merges with the loss cor-
poration, the stockholders of the latter acquiring twenty per cent of the
stock so that there is compliance with Section 382(b).
Does Section 269 operate to impair the loss deduction available to
the acquiring corporation under these circumstances?
The foregoing question is not free from doubt. As in the other
examples discussed, the carryover of a loss in mergers is specifically
authorized in Section 381 and the transaction is not prohibited in Sec-
tion 382. In the legislative history of the latter section, it has been
observed that
"the 20 percent requirement cannot be watered down by inserting
one or more corporate entities between the corporation with the loss
and the corporation deducting the loss." 41
It would seem that the corporation which deducts the loss in the ex-
ample could not, therefore, be merely a holding company. On the
other hand, if it were an active operating company, it should be said
to comply with the requirements of Section 382 (b) even though it had
the same stockholders as thioriginal corporation and had recently been
carved from it. As to future business, it would stand or fall on its own
activities.
Here again the terms of Section 269 (a) are broad enough to
cause a disallowance of the deduction; the arguments against applica-
tion of the section made in the preceding paragraphs are equally ap-
plicable here. It should be noted that the step transaction doctrine is
likewise potentially applicable. On the other hand, multiple business
purposes motivating a merger of the split-off corporation 'and the loss
corporation may be alleged. Most important from a practical stand-
point, a fair interpretation of Section 382 is that it is only intended to
require a continuity of interest by stockholders of the loss corporation
in the acquiring corporation. As long as the acquiring corporation is
in fact a separate and independent operating entity, no perversion of
congressional intent would arise from permitting the loss notwith-
standing that the acquiring corporation was carved out from another."2
Carryovers Not Involving Net Operating Losses
It has already been noted that Section 381 provides for carryover
of many tax benefits in addition to net operating losses. The restric-
41. SExATE REPORT 286.
42. If, as has been suggested (at page 586 spra), § 269 does not apply to
corporate divisions this would constitute additional evidence that a split-off followed
by merger under § 382 would not be impaired by § 269.
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tions of Section 382, however, are limited to the latter deductions.
Neither that section nor Section 381 place restrictions on carryover of
deficits, capital losses and other items.
What then, is the effect of Section 269 on carryover of these items?
All of the arguments urged to preclude application of Section 269
to net operating loss carryovers are applicable here. In addition, since
Section 382 does not apply to any carryover except for net operating
losses, any observation that Section 269 might operate to disallow net
operating losses, where Section 382 did not, would be irrelevant in
measuring the effect of Section 269 on non-operating loss deductions.
In addition, Section 129 never was applied to these items and they
were not included in the scope of the regulations under it. It is also
appropriate to observe that here, as in the net operating loss cases, com-
mercial purposes abound and decisions under the old Code denote great
reluctance by the Tax Court to forfeit a deduction. This reluctance
was recognized by a Congress which nevertheless did nothing to
strengthen this portion of the statute. Instead, they adopted an amend-
ment which created a presumption for the Commissioner in cases where
a person might have been buying depreciation but specifically excluded
purchase of other tax benefits-including.these-from consideration in
the creation of the presumption. It is appropriate to conclude as a
practical matter that, given any commercial purpose at all, the acquisi-
tion of control of a corporation with such benefits, and subsequent use
of them, is not threatened by Section 269.
CONCLUSION
It should be reiterated that these comments do not purport to in-
terpret the present status of the business purpose and step transaction
doctrines. Actually, the doctrines enunciated in the Bazley 3 and
Gregory "' cases may afford a sounder basis for a present Treasury at-
tack on tax-saving devices than Section 269. This is because the
extent to which Section 129 was nullified by the Tax Court is manifest.
The vigor of the business purpose and step transaction doctrines, may
have been lessened in recent years but no one can doubt that there is
still substantial vigor in them.
As long as Section 269 is on the books in its present form
there is a prospect that it may be invoked at some time by the courts.
Nevertheless, some showing of a business purpose is easy to make in all
the examples discussed and the burden of proof on the taxpayer is slight
under decided cases interpreting the language in the section. Accord-
43. Bazley v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 737 (1947).
44. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
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ingly, the possibility of a court invoking Section 269 to disallow a de-
duction seems extremely remote in any carefully planned transaction
involving carryover, whether or not Sections 381 or 382 apply. The
possibility does, however, exist. This means that only the foolhardy
will approach transactions which will eventuate in carryover of a loss
without all available evidence, documentary if possible, of commercial
non-tax motivations for the transaction.
A basic problem in interpreting Section 269 is that we have no
consistent underlying philosophy of taxation manifest in this Code.45
Beyond that, Congress might have rigidly forbidden the traffic in net
operating loss carryovers by tightening the provisions of Sections 269
and 382, and refusing to adopt Section 381. It might have opened the
door to such traffic by specifically providing that Section 269 did not
apply to any cases except those involving purchase of high basis assets
which had a low value. Either of these courses would clarify the rights
of taxpayers and ease the path of court and counsel considering a trans-
fer of such a loss. This objective was continually stressed in the com-
mittee reports. On the basis of all the circumstances discussed, it was
probably intended that Section 269 should be emasculated, except as to
cases involving purchase of depreciation or loss assets. However, the
fact is that Section 129 was not repealed (except to the extent it was
repealed by implication through the adoption of Section 269 (c)), and
it was observed in the Senate Report that the section might apply to
cases not covered by Section 382.46 Thus, through ignorance or in-
advertence or both, Congress made threatening gestures in Section 269
toward the traffic in loss corporations encouraged in Section 381, per-
mitted under Section 382, and excluded by Section 269 (c) from rele-
vance in showing a violation of other subsections. It would only be
possible to further complicate such a result if the committee reports were
filled with such contradictory comments as those to the effect that Sec-
tion 269 was intended to stop bargain purchases of depreciation, against
which may be compared the warning that a transfer of a net operating
loss not caught under Section 382 might yet be caught under Section
269. Congress has disobliged the taxpayer in this respect as well.
45. But see Reiling, Developing a Law of Income Taxatim, 32 TAXES 546
(1954). This result in the new Code was inevitable if, as has been suggested, it was
drafted primarily in response to taxpayer complaint filed with Congress and the
Treasury Department.
46. The difficulty of interpreting this statute in the light of such comments
is one frequently encountered in any legislation of a politically sensitive nature.
Statutes having the obvious purpose of eliminating inequities (sometimes described
as opening loopholes) are not always easy to explain. Sometimes Congress finds
it expedient to pretend that some reason exists for a change which is not apparent
in the statute itself: a little salesmanship is needed. Accordingly congressional re-
ports do not always bear a close relation to the content or intended scope of the bill.
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